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This article examines how the 1979 International
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages and the 1988
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) collectively fill many of
the limitations in the provisions of the international treaties on
piracy. Further, the 2005 SUA Protocol makes significant
improvements to its predecessor. Used together, these
instruments complement each other in the context of piracy and
armed robbery at sea. However, implementation through
domestic legislation is essential to enabling nations to suppress
acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea.

*

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author alone and are
not intended to reflect the positions of any department or agency of the
U.S. Government. This paper is adapted and updated from J. Ashley
Roach, Global Conventions on Piracy, Ship Hijacking, Hostage Taking
and Maritime Terrorism: Prospects for Cooperation, in PIRACY AND
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME CRIMES IN ASEAN 38 (Robert C. Beckman &
J. Ashley Roach eds., 2012). Captain J. Ashley Roach, JAGC, U.S.
Navy (retired) was attorney adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser,
U.S. Department of State, from 1988 until he retired at the end of
January 2009, responsible for law of the sea matters. He has taught,
advised and published extensively on national maritime claims and
other law of the sea issues, including piracy and armed robbery at sea.
He has negotiated, and participated in the negotiation of, numerous
international agreements involving law of the sea issues. He received his
LL.M. (highest honors in public international law and comparative law)
from the George Washington University School of Law in 1971 and his
J.D. from the University of Pennsylvania Law School in 1963.
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I.

Introduction

This article analyzes three U.N. counter-terrorism conventions as
potential tools to combat piracy and other serious international
maritime crimes. Rather than create new legal instruments to address
maritime piracy, these three conventions provide mechanisms to deal
with ship-hijacking, the taking of crew members hostage for ransom,
and unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation.
Considered in the context of the twenty participants of the Djibouti
Code of Conduct (“DCOC”),1 the three treaties are the 1979
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (“HostageTaking Convention”),2 the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of
1.

Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Adoption of the Code of Conduct Concerning
the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in the
Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, Djibouti Meeting Res. 1
(Jan. 29, 2009), available at http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/
PIU/Documents/Djibouti Code of Conduct%20English.pdf; Signatory
States,
IMO,
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PIU/Pages/
Signatory-States.aspx (last visited Sept. 23, 2013); infra Table 1.

2.

International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, opened for
signature Dec. 18, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11,081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 206 (entered
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Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (“1988 SUA
Convention”),3 and the Protocol of 2005 to the 1988 SUA Convention
(“2005 SUA Protocol”).4 In addition to these three conventions,
several other treaties may provide support in combating piracy and
other serious international maritime crimes. These treaties are
referenced throughout the article, and they are included in Table 2.
The DCOC was formulated in response to the escalating incidents of
piracy off the coast of Somalia. It calls for, inter alia, the promotion
of greater regional cooperation among the participants as a means
more effectively to prevent, prosecute, and punish those who commit
piratical acts at sea.5 Given the commitments enshrined in the
DCOC, the Djibouti participants should recognize the utility of these
three conventions in achieving the goals set out therein. Therefore,
after detailing the relevant provisions of the three treaties, this article
proposes that the DCOC members should ratify these conventions
and pass domestic legislation incorporating the substance of the
treaties.
A.

Status of Conventions6

The Hostage-Taking Convention currently has 173 parties,
including nearly all of the participants in the DCOC except Eritrea,
the Maldives, and Somalia.7 Of the participants in the DCOC,
into force June 3, 1983) [hereinafter Hostage-Taking Convention],
available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/english-18-5.pdf.
3.

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, opened for signature Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S.
221 (entered into force Mar. 1, 1992) [hereinafter 1988 SUA
Convention].

4.

Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, opened for signature
Feb. 14, 2006, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.15/21 (entered into force July 28,
2010) [hereinafter 2005 SUA Protocol]. The consolidated text of the
1988 SUA Convention as modified by the 2005 Protocol is available at
https://www.unodc.org/tldb/en/2005_Cons_Version_Conv_and_Prot
_Maritime_Navigation.html. This article does not address the 1988 and
2005 Protocols for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety
of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf or the 2003
Convention against Corruption.

5.

Djibouti Code of Conduct, supra note 1, pmbl.

6.

Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, U.N.
TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ParticipationStatus.
aspx (last visited Mar. 14, 2014) (noting the location where the status of
treaties registered with the U.N. may be viewed).

7.

International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, U.N. TREATY
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no
=XVIII-5&chapter=18&lang=en (last visited Mar. 14, 2014) (describing
the status of the parties and signatories to the Hostage-Taking
Convention).
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Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman,
South Africa, Sudan, UAE, and Tanzania have either existing
domestic legislation dealing with the crime of hostage-taking, or they
have enacted legislation implementing the Convention.8
Similar in size, the 1988 SUA Convention currently has 163
parties, including all of the participants in the DCOC except Eritrea
and Somalia.9 Of the participants in the Djibouti Code of Conduct,
Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Maldives, Oman, South Africa, Sudan,
UAE, Tanzania, and Yemen have either existing domestic legislation
addressing maritime security, or they enacted legislation
implementing the Convention.10
The 2005 SUA Protocol is the smallest of the three conventions,
with a current membership of 29 parties. None of the participants in
the DCOC are party to the 2005 SUA Protocol except Saudi Arabia.11
As discussed in the following sections, these three conventions can
adequately provide a framework for combating piracy, which is the
central goal of the DCOC. This brief status report suggests that there
are several holes in the legal framework to diffuse the piracy situation
off the coast of Somalia. The remainder of this article propounds that
until all DCOC participants ratify and implement these important
conventions, the DCOC objectives—namely, providing lasting
solutions to maritime piracy—cannot be obtained. By building a
complete foundation for legal accountability of pirates through these
treaties, the DCOC countries would serve both their individual and
collective self-interests.
8.

See generally Browse Countries, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME,
https://www.unodc.org/tldb/browse_countries.html (last visited Mar.
14, 2013) (listing U.N. member states and linking to each state’s
substantive criminal law implementing the Hostage-Taking Convention).

9.

IMO, Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in Respect of
Which the International Maritime Organization or Its Secretary-General
Performs
Depository
or
Other
Functions
418–19
(2014),
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Docume
nts/Status%20-%202014.pdf.

10.

See Browse Countries, supra note 8 (providing a link to each state’s
substantive criminal law relating to maritime security); U.N.
Secretary-General, Letter dated 23 March 2012 from the
Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2012/177 (Mar. 23, 2012) (detailing the domestic enactment of
anti-piracy criminal legislation and the prosecution efforts against
pirates in forty-two U.N. member states); see generally National
Legislation on Piracy, U.N. OCEANS AND LAW OF THE SEA,
http://www.un.org/Depts/ los/piracy/piracy_national_legislation.htm
(last updated Oct. 26, 2011) (listing those states with implementing
legislation on piracy in compliance with G.A. Res. 64/71).

11.

See IMO, supra note 9, at 430–31 (listing, inter alia, those states that
are party to the 2005 SUA Protocol).
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B.

Criminal Jurisdiction at Sea Generally

The existence and scope of criminal jurisdiction at sea is governed
by the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In
UNCLOS, who may exercise criminal jurisdiction at sea depends on
the maritime location. Seaward of the territorial sea, the flag state has
exclusive jurisdiction over vessels flying its flag.12 Except in cases of
piracy or suspected statelessness,13 no foreign state may board another
nation’s vessels or arrest persons on board without the vessel’s
permission, granted ad hoc or in advance by international agreement.
This rule was not changed by the 2005 SUA Protocol.
In the territorial sea, generally speaking, no foreign vessel may be
boarded without the coastal state’s permission. This is not always the
case, as some coastal states also require the flag state’s permission to
board.14 UNCLOS seeks to restrain the exercise of criminal
jurisdiction by the coastal state on board a foreign ship in the
territorial sea. Article 27 of UNCLOS allows such jurisdiction in only
a few enumerated circumstances:
1.

The criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State should not be
exercised on board a foreign ship passing through the
territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any
investigation in connection with any crime committed on
board the ship during its passage, save only in the
following cases:
(a)

if the consequences of the crime extend to the
coastal State;

(b)

if the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the
country or the good order of the territorial sea;

(c)

if the assistance of the local authorities has been
requested by the master of the ship or by a
diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag State;
or

(d)

if such measures are necessary for the suppression of
illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic
substances.

12.

U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 58(2), 92(1), opened for
signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16,
1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS] (stating that flag states have exclusive
jurisdiction over ships flying their flags in the high seas). All
participants in the Djibouti Code of Conduct except Eritrea, Ethiopia
and the UAE are party. See infra Table 1.

13.

UNCLOS, supra note 12, arts. 105, 110, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 437, 438.

14.

Id. art. 27, at 407.
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2.

The above provisions do not affect the right of the coastal
State to take any steps authorized by its laws for the
purpose of an arrest or investigation on board a foreign
ship passing through the territorial sea after leaving
internal waters.

3.

In the cases provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2, the
coastal State shall, if the master so requests, notify a
diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag State before
taking any steps, and shall facilitate contact between such
agent or officer and the ship’s crew. In cases of emergency
this notification may be communicated while the measures
are being taken.

4.

In considering whether or in what manner an arrest should
be made, the local authorities shall have due regard to the
interests of navigation.

5.

Except as provided in Part XII or with respect to
violations of laws and regulations adopted in accordance
with Part V, the coastal State may not take any steps on
board a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea to
arrest any person or to conduct any investigation in
connection with any crime committed before the ship
entered the territorial sea, if the ship, proceeding from a
foreign port, is only passing through the territorial sea
without entering internal waters.15
C.

Obligations of State Parties

The Hostage-Taking Convention and the two SUA Conventions
each obligate state parties to take a number of actions to carry out
the international obligations the parties undertook by ratifying or
acceding to those treaties.
First, state parties are required to make the offenses enumerated
in the convention crimes under their national law punishable by
“appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of
those offenses.”16 These offenses are described in greater detail in the
following section of this article. Next, state parties are required to
15.

Id. Article 27 is adapted from Article 19 of the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. Compare id. (stating
UNCLOS’ treatment of coastal state criminal jurisdiction over foreign
ships), with Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
art. 19, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516
U.N.T.S. 205 (specifying the Convention on the Territorial Sea’s
treatment of coastal state criminal jurisdiction over foreign ships).

16.

Hostage-Taking Convention, supra note 2, art. 2, 1316 U.N.T.S. at 207;
1988 SUA Convention, supra note 3, art. 5, 1678 U.N.T.S. at 226; 2005
SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 5.
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establish jurisdiction over the offender: (a) if the offense occurred
within its territory, including its territorial sea; (b) if it is the flag
state; (c) if the offender is the state party’s national; or (d) if the
offender is present in the state party’s territory.17
Additionally, state parties are required, if the alleged offender is
present in the state party’s territory, to take the individual into
custody, and either seek to prosecute or extradite the individual.18
Finally, state parties are required to provide the greatest measure of
assistance in connection with the criminal proceedings. This may
include supplying evidence in the case of the Hostage-Taking
Convention or assistance in obtaining such evidence in the case of the
SUA Convention, when the state parties have the information at their
disposal.19

II. Offenses Under All Three Conventions Under
Analysis
A.

Offenses Under the Hostage-Taking Convention

Article 1 of the Hostage-Taking Convention defines the offense of
hostage-taking as follows:
1.

Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to
injure or to continue to detain another person (hereinafter
referred to as the “hostage”) in order to compel a third
party, namely, a State, an international intergovernmental
organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of
persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit
or implicit condition for the release of the hostage commits
the offence of taking hostages (“hostage-taking”) with the
meaning of this Convention.

2.

Any person who:

17.

See Hostage-Taking Convention, supra note 2, art. 5, 1316 U.N.T.S. at
207–08; 1988 SUA Convention, supra note 3, art. 6(1), 1678 U.N.T.S. at
226; 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 6(1). The SUA Conventions
also permit a party to establish jurisdiction if a SUA offense (a) is
committed by a stateless person habitually resident in that state, or
(b) if one of its nationals is seized, threatened or killed, or (c) the
offense is committed in an attempt to compel that state to do or abstain
from doing any act. 1988 SUA Convention, supra note 3, art. 6(2), 1678
U.N.T.S. at 226; 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 6(2).

18.

Hostage-Taking Convention, supra note 2, arts. 6(1), 8(1), 1316
U.N.T.S. at 208–09; 1988 SUA Convention, supra note 3, arts. 7(1),
10(1), 1678 U.N.T.S. at 227–29; 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, arts.
7(1), 10(1).

19.

Hostage-Taking Convention, supra note 2, art. 11(1), 1316 U.N.T.S. at
210; 1988 SUA Convention, supra note 3, art. 12(1), 1678 U.N.T.S. at
230; 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 12(1).
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(a)

Attempts to commit an act of hostage-taking, or

(b)

Participates as an accomplice of anyone who
commits or attempts to commit an act of hostagetaking likewise commits an offence for the purposes
of this Convention.20

Accordingly, the offense of hostage-taking involves three elements
as defined by this convention. The offense of hostage-taking requires
(1) an individual to detain a person, (2) in order to compel another to
act or not act, (3) as a condition for release of the hostage.
B.

Offenses Under the 1988 SUA Convention

Article 3 of the 1988 SUA Convention defines the following
offenses:
1.

Any person commits an offence if that person unlawfully
and intentionally:
(a)

seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or
threat thereof or any other form of intimidation; or

(b)

performs an act of violence against a person on
board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe
navigation of that ship; or

(c)

destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its
cargo which is likely to endanger the safe navigation
of that ship; or

(d)

places or causes to be placed on a ship, by any
means whatsoever, a device or substance which is
likely to destroy that ship, or cause damage to that
ship or its cargo which endangers or is likely to
endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or

(e)

destroys or seriously damages maritime navigational
facilities or seriously interferes with their operation,
if any such act is likely to endanger the safe
navigation of a ship; or

(f)

communicates information which he knows to be
false, thereby endangering the safe navigation of a
ship;21 or

20.

Hostage-Taking Convention, supra note 2, art. 1, 1316 U.N.T.S. at 207.

21.

1988 SUA Convention, supra note 3, art. 3(f), 1678 U.N.T.S. at 225; see
also 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 4(2) (replacing
subparagraph (f) with the following gender-neutral text: “communicates

98

CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 46·2013
Global Conventions on Maritime Crimes Involving Piratical Acts
(g)

2.

injures or kills any person, in connection with the
commission or the attempted commission of any of
the offences set forth in subparagraphs (a) to (f).22

Any person also commits an offence if that person:
(a)

attempts to commit any of the offences set forth in
paragraph 1; or

(b)

abets the commission of any of the offences set forth
in paragraph 1 perpetrated by any person or is
otherwise an accomplice of a person who commits
such an offence; or

(c)

threatens, with or without a condition, as is
provided for under national law, aimed at compelling
a physical or juridical person to do or refrain from
doing any act, to commit any of the offences set
forth in paragraph 1, subparagraphs (b), (c) and (e),
if that threat is likely to endanger the safe
navigation of the ship in question.23

Thus, the scope of maritime offenses under the 1988 SUA
Convention is broad—it covers nearly all acts of violence committed
against ships, and also punishes those who attempt, abet, or threaten
such violent acts.

information which that person knows to be false, thereby endangering
the safe navigation of a ship”).
22.

1988 SUA Convention supra note 3, art. 3(g), 1678 U.N.T.S. at 225; see
also 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 4(3) (deleting
subparagraph (g) from the 1988 SUA Convention).

23.

1988 SUA Convention, supra note 3, art. 3, 1678 U.N.T.S. at 225; see
also 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 4(4) (replacing paragraph 2
with the following text: “Any person also commits an offence if that
person threatens, with or without a condition, as is provided for under
national law, aimed at compelling a physical or juridical person to do or
refrain from doing any act, to commit any of the offences set forth in
paragraphs 1 (b), (c), and (e), if that threat is likely to endanger the
safe navigation of the ship in question.”); see also id. art. 4(7) (moving
provisions of subparagraphs (a) and (b) on accessory offenses to Article
3quater).
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C.

Offenses Under the 2005 SUA Protocol24

Paragraphs 5-7 of Article 4 of the 2005 SUA Protocol expand the
reach created by the 1988 SUA Convention by adding four new
categories of offenses under the Convention. These new categories
include using a ship in a terrorist offense; transporting a WMD,
delivery systems, and related items; transporting a terrorist fugitive;
and accessory offenses.
1.

Counterterrorism offenses

Article 4(5) of the 2005 SUA Protocol adds Article 3bis(1)(a) to
the 1988 SUA Convention, making it an offense for a person to
unlawfully and intentionally, with the purpose of intimidating a
population, or compelling a government or an international
organization to do or abstain from doing any of these acts:
(i)

use[] against or on a ship or discharge[] from a ship any
explosive, radioactive material or BCN weapon25 in a
manner that causes or is likely to cause death or serious
injury or damage;

(ii) discharge[], from a ship, oil, liquefied natural gas, or other
hazardous or noxious substance . . . in such a quantity or
concentration that causes or is likely to cause death or
serious injury or damage;
(iii) use[] a ship in a manner that causes death or serious injury
or damage; or (iv) threaten[] . . . to commit an offence set
forth in subparagraph (a)(i), (ii), or (iii).26
2.

Non-proliferation provisions

Article 4(5) of the 2005 SUA Protocol also adds 3bis(1)(b) to the
1988 SUA Convention and makes it an offense to transport on board
a ship:
(i)

any explosive or radioactive material, knowing that it is
intended to be used to cause, or in a threat to cause . . .
death or serious injury or damage for the purpose of
intimidating a population, or compelling a government or

24.

See S. TREATY DOC. NO. 110-8, at XI–XV (2007) [hereinafter SEN. T.
DOC. 110-8], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC110tdoc8/pdf/CDOC-110tdoc8.pdf (summarizing the new offenses
created by the 2005 SUA Protocol concerning safety of maritime
navigation and fixed platforms on the continental shelf).

25.

2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 2(1)(d) (defining “BCN” as
biological, chemical and nuclear).

26.

Id. art. 4(5).
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an international organization to do or to abstain from
doing any act; or
(ii) any BCN weapon, knowing it to be a BCN weapon as
defined in article 1; or
(iii) any source material, special fissionable material, or
equipment or material especially designed or prepared for
the processing, use or production of special fissionable
material, knowing that it is intended to be used in a
nuclear explosive activity or in any other nuclear activity
not under safeguards pursuant to an IAEA comprehensive
safeguards agreement; or
(iv) any equipment, materials or software or related technology
that significantly contributes to the design, manufacture or
delivery of a BCN weapon, with the intention that it will
be used for such purpose.27

These nonproliferation offenses make significant advances to
counterterrorism efforts by filling a gap in the existing international
treaty framework. The 2005 SUA Protocol requires criminalization of
certain transports of nuclear-related items associated with nuclear
weapons or nuclear explosive devices, and thus it provides a
complementary law enforcement element to the nuclear
nonproliferation regime. The revised Article 3bis(1)(b)(iv) of the 1988
SUA Convention pursuant to the 2005 SUA Protocol goes beyond the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons28 (NPT), as it
requires the criminalization of the transport of equipment, materials,
or software or related technology that significantly contributes to the
design or manufacture of delivery systems for nuclear weapons (other
than those of NPT nuclear-weapon state parties). The
nonproliferation offenses further the objectives of, and are
complementary with, the nonproliferation obligations set forth in
U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1673, adopted in 2004
and 2006 respectively.29

27.

Id.

28.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for
signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into
force Mar. 5, 1970) (in which states undertake not to transfer nuclear
weapons, but such conduct is not criminalized). All participants in the
Djibouti Code of Conduct have either acceded or ratified this treaty. See
Status of the Treaty - Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, UNODA, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt (last
visited Mar. 14, 2014).

29.

S.C. Res. 1540, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004); S.C.
Res. 1673, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1673 (Apr. 27, 2006).
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Under the 2005 SUA Protocol, Article 3bis(2) of the 1988 SUA
Convention constitutes a nonproliferation “savings clause” by
specifying that nuclear transport activities remain permissible under
the 1988 SUA Convention in certain circumstances, notwithstanding
the wording of the offenses in article 3bis(1)(b).30 Article 3bis(2) states
that transporting an item or material covered by Article
3bis(1)(b)(iii) or, insofar as it relates to a nuclear weapon or other
nuclear explosive device, Article 3bis(1)(b)(iv), will not be an offense
within the meaning of the 1988 SUA Convention if the item or
material in question is transported to or from the territory of, or is
otherwise transported under the control of a state party to the NPT.
This is true where:
(a)

the resulting transfer or receipt, including internal to a
State, of the item or material is not contrary to such State
Party’s obligations under the [NPT] and,

(b) if the item or material is intended for the delivery system
of a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device of a
State Party to the [NPT], the holding of such weapon or
device is not contrary to that State Party’s obligations
under that Treaty.31

This nonproliferation savings clause in the revised Article 3bis(2)
of the 1988 SUA Convention, coupled with the general provision in
Article 2bis(3) declaring that the 1988 SUA Convention shall not
affect the rights and obligations of state parties under the NPT,
ensures that the 1988 SUA Convention is consistent with the rights
and obligations of the state parties to the NPT (except to the extent
that the 1988 SUA Convention goes beyond the NPT with respect to
nuclear weapon delivery systems). As provided in Article 3bis(2) of
the 1988 SUA Convention, the treaty would not require
criminalization of the transport to or from the territory of, or under
the control of, an NPT state party of source or special fissionable
material. The same is true of equipment or material specifically
designed or prepared for the processing, use, or production of special
fissionable material, as long as the resulting transfer or receipt of such
items or materials is not contrary to the NPT obligations of the NPT
state party. This is the case even when a non-NPT party is on the
“other end” of the transport to or from (or under the control of) the
NPT state party.32

30.

2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 4(5).

31.

Id.

32.

Id.
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3.

Transport of terrorist fugitives

Article 4(6) of the 2005 SUA Protocol adds Article 3ter to the
1988 SUA Convention. Article 3ter makes it an offense for a person to
unlawfully and intentionally transport another person on board a ship
with knowledge that the person has committed an act that constitutes
an offense under Article 3, 3bis or 3quater, or an offense set forth in
one of the treaties listed in the Annex to the 1988 SUA Convention.
Furthermore, it is an offense to assist that person in evading criminal
prosecution.33 The Annex is added to the 1988 SUA Convention by
Article 7 of the 2005 SUA Protocol.34 The inclusion of such an Annex
mirrors the approach to the Terrorist Financing Convention.35
Although accessory provisions in the existing counterterrorism
conventions and protocols may criminalize aiding and abetting a
fugitive to flee during the course of a crime, this provision would
criminalize assisting a fugitive to avoid apprehension after the crime
has been completed.
4.

Accessory offenses

Article 3quater provides a comprehensive framework creating
criminal liability for accessory offenses. This was added to the 1988
SUA Convention by Article 4(7) of the 2005 SUA Protocol.36
Subparagraph (a) of Article 3quater makes it an offense to kill or
injure any person in connection with any offense under Articles 3(1),
3bis, or 3ter of the Convention. Subparagraph (b) of Article 3quater
makes it an offense to attempt to commit an offense under
Articles 3(1), 3bis(1)(a)(i)–(iii), or 3quater(a) of the 1988 SUA
Convention. Subparagraphs (c) and (d) of Article 3quater make it an
offense to participate as an accomplice or to organize or direct others
in connection with any offense under Articles 3, 3bis, 3ter, or
3quater(a) or (b). Finally, subparagraph (e) of Article 3quater makes
it an offense to contribute to the commission of one or more offenses
under Articles 3, 3bis, 3ter, or 3quater(a) or (b) by a group of persons
acting with a common purpose.37 These accessory offenses are
substantially the same as those provided for by the Terrorist
33.

Id. art. 4(6).

34.

Id. art. 4(7).

35.

International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, opened for signature Jan. 10, 2000, 2178 U.N.T.S. 229
(entered into force Apr. 10, 2002) [hereinafter Terrorism Financing
Convention]. This treaty includes all participants in the Djibouti Code
of Conduct except Eritrea and Somalia (although Somalia has signed it).
See infra Table 2.

36.

2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 4(7).

37.

Id.
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Bombings Convention38 and the Terrorism Financing Convention.39
They strengthen the ability of the international community to
investigate, prosecute, and extradite those who conspire or otherwise
contribute to the commission of offenses under the 1988 SUA
Convention.
Thus, the SUA Conventions and the related treaties on
nonproliferation and terrorism work in concert to provide an extensive
legal regime where all manner of violent acts that could occur through
maritime piracy are addressed.

III. Requirement for Transnational Element
For the Hostage-Taking Convention to apply, the offense must
have some transnational character. In particular, the Hostage-Taking
Convention provides that it does not apply if the offense is committed
within a single state, or if the hostage and alleged offender are
nationals of that state and the alleged offender is found in the
territory of that state.40
For the SUA Conventions to apply to a particular situation, the
offense must have a different transnational character. Offenses under
the 1988 SUA Convention and the 2005 SUA Protocol apply “if the
ship is navigating of is scheduled to navigate into, through or from
waters beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single State,
or the lateral limits of its territorial sea with adjacent States.”41
Nevertheless, if the 1988 SUA Convention does not apply pursuant to
Article 4(1), it applies “when the offender . . . is found in the territory
of a State Party other than the State referred to in” Article 4(1).42
Thus, the 1988 SUA Convention applies where a covered offense
occurs in the territorial sea of a state or if the offender is found in the
territory of another state party.
Accordingly, offenses under these conventions are not limited to
the high seas and exclusive economic zone as in the case of piracy.

38.

International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings,
opened for signature Jan. 12, 1998, 2149 U.N.T.S. 284 (entered into
force May 23, 2001) [hereinafter Terrorist Bombing Convention]. All
participants in the Djibouti Code of Conduct except Eritrea, Jordan,
Oman, and Somalia are parties. See infra Table 2.

39.

See Terrorist Bombing Convention, supra note 38, art. 2, 2149 U.N.T.S.
at 285–86; Terrorism Financing Convention, supra note 35, art. 2, 2178
U.N.T.S. at 230–31.

40.

Hostage-Taking Convention, supra note 2, art. 13, 1316 U.N.T.S. at 210.

41.

1988 SUA Convention, supra note 3, art. 4(1), 1678 U.N.T.S. at 225.

42.

1988 SUA Convention, supra note 3, art. 4(2), 1678 U.N.T.S. at 226;
2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 4(2).
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Rather, in defined circumstances, they may also occur in the
territorial sea.

IV. Persons Who Can Commit Hostage-Taking or SUA
Offenses
There are three categories of persons who can commit the offense
of hostage-taking. The first category is comprised of those that
actually commit an act of hostage-taking. The second includes those
that attempt to commit an act of hostage-taking. Finally, the third
category comprises those that participate as an accomplice of anyone
who commits or attempts to commit an act of hostage-taking.43
As opposed to the Hostage-Taking Convention, there are six
categories of persons who can commit a SUA offense under the 2005
SUA Protocol. The six categories include those that actually commit
a SUA offense; those that attempt to commit a SUA offense; those
that participate as an accomplice of anyone who commits a SUA
offense; those who organize or direct others to commit a SUA offense;
those who unlawfully and intentionally injure or kill a person in
connection with the commission of a SUA offense; and those who
contribute to the commission of one or more SUA offenses by a group
of persons’ actions with a common purpose. For this final category,
the action must be intentional, and it must occur either with the aim
of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group,
where the activity or purpose involves the commission of a SUA
offense, or the knowledge of the group’s intention to commit a SUA
offense.44
Under all three major treaties, the scope of the offenses can
include piratical acts committed at sea.

V. INNOCENT PERSONS45
The 2005 SUA Protocol was drafted to prevent innocent seafarers
from subjection to criminal prosecution under the 1988 SUA
Convention simply for being on board a vessel that was engaged in
illegal actions. This is the case even where the seafarer had mere
knowledge of the criminal activity.
The offenses enumerated in Article 3bis(1)(b)46 apply by virtue of
the definition of “transport” in Article 2 of the 2005 SUA Protocol to
43.

Hostage-Taking Convention, supra note 2, art. 1(2), 1316 U.N.T.S. at
207.

44.

2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 4 (amending or creating
Articles 3, 3bis, 3ter, 3quater).

45.

SEN. T. DOC. 110-8, supra note 24, at XVI–XVII (describing how the
2005 SUA Protocol protects innocent seafarers from criminal
prosecution).
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those persons who initiate, arrange, or exercise effective control,
including decision-making authority, over the movement of a person
or item.47 This definition would exclude from criminal liability
seafarers and employees on shore, except in those rare cases where
they are actively engaged in the criminal activity.
The individual offenses added by the 2005 SUA Protocol contain
subjective elements that would exclude innocent carriers and seafarers
from their reach. For example, under the provision that covers certain
dual use items (Article 3bis(1)(b)(iv)), the transporter must have the
intention that the dual use item will be used in the design,
manufacture, or delivery of a BCN weapon.48 In most situations, a
seafarer, for example, would not have the requisite general knowledge
and intent, let alone the additional specific intent required under this
provision. When containers are ordinarily sealed and loaded at port, a
seafarer likely would not know what is in the containers. In order for
a seafarer to be held criminally liable, a prosecuting state must prove
three elements. First, the state must prove that the seafarer knew
what the item was. Second the state must prove that the seafarer
intentionally initiated, arranged, or exercised effective control,
including decision-making authority, over the movement of the item
by, for example, smuggling the item on board or placing the item in a
container to be loaded on the ship. Finally, the prosecuting state must
prove that the seafarer intended for the item to be used in the design,
manufacture, or delivery of a BCN weapon.49

VI. Ship Boarding Under the 2005 SUA Protocol
The 2005 SUA Protocol contains a comprehensive provision on
the procedures for obtaining flag state consent to board ships seaward
of the territorial sea suspected of committing offenses. The 2005 SUA
Protocol also includes a provision outlining the conduct of such
boardings.50
Article 8(2) of the 2005 SUA Protocol adds Article 8bis to the
1988 SUA Convention.51 Article 8bis creates a ship boarding regime
by establishing a comprehensive set of procedures and protections
designed to facilitate the boarding of a vessel suspected of being

46.

See supra Section II.C.2.

47.

2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 2.

48.

Id. art. 4(5).

49.

See id. arts. 2, 4(5).

50.

See SEN. T. DOC. 110-8, supra note 24, at XVII–XXIV (summarizing
Article 8bis of the 2005 SUA Protocol).

51.

2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 8(2).

106

CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 46·2013
Global Conventions on Maritime Crimes Involving Piratical Acts

involved in an offense under the 1988 SUA Convention.52 The
boarding procedures do not change existing international maritime
law, nor do they infringe upon the traditional principle of freedom of
navigation. Instead, the procedures eliminate the need to negotiate
time-consuming ad hoc boarding arrangements when facing the
immediacy of ongoing criminal activity.
The first three paragraphs of Article 8bis set forth general
parameters for the ship boarding regime. State parties must cooperate
to the fullest extent possible to prevent and suppress offenses under
the 1988 SUA Convention, in conformity with international law, and
to respond to requests under the boarding regime as expeditiously as
possible.53 This provision is derived from Article 17(1) of the 1988
U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic
Substances
(“1988
Vienna
Narcotic
Drug
Convention”),54 in addition to Article 7 of the Protocol Against the
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (“Migrant Smuggling
Protocol”),
supplementing
the
U.N.
Convention
Against
Transnational Organized Crime.55
Each request should, if possible, contain the name of the
suspected ship, the ship’s International Maritime Organization (IMO)
identification number, the port of registry, the ports of origin and
destination, and any other relevant information.56 In addition, each
state party must take into account the dangers and difficulties
involved in boarding a ship at sea and searching its cargo. Each state
party must consider whether other appropriate measures agreed
between the states concerned could be more safely taken in the next
port of call or elsewhere.57

52.

Id.

53.

Id.

54.

U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, opened for signature Dec. 20, 1988, 1582
U.N.T.S. 165 (entered into force Nov. 11, 1990) [hereinafter 1988 Vienna
Narcotic Drug Convention]. All participants in the Djibouti Code of
Conduct except Somalia are party to this Convention. See infra
Table 2.

55.

Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air,
supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime, opened for signature Dec. 12, 2000, 2241 U.N.T.S. 507
(entered into force Jan. 28, 2004) [hereinafter Migrant Smuggling
Protocol]. All participants in the Djibouti Code of Conduct except
Comoros, Eritrea, Jordan, Maldives, Somalia, Sudan, UAE, and Yemen
are party to this Protocol. See infra Table 2.

56.

2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 8 (adding these requirements in
Article 8bis(2)).

57.

Id. art. 8 (including these factors in Article 8bis(3)).
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Pursuant to paragraph 4 of article 8bis, if a state party has
reasonable grounds to suspect that an offense under Articles 3, 3bis,
3ter, or 3quater of the 1988 SUA Convention has been, is being, or is
about to be committed involving a ship flying its flag, the state party
may request the assistance of other state parties in preventing or
suppressing that offense. The requested state parties shall use their
best endeavors to render such assistance within the means available to
them.58 This provision is derived from Article 17(2) of the 1988
Vienna Narcotic Drug Convention and Article 8(1) of the Migrant
Smuggling Protocol. This provision does not obligate a party to board
or take law enforcement actions on foreign-flagged ships, except to the
extent it is required to use best endeavors to render assistance within
the means available to it upon request of a flag state to assist in
prevention or suppression of an offense specified under the 1988 SUA
Convention.59 The absence of a reference in paragraph 4 to “marks of
registry” (both “flying its flag” and “displaying marks of registry” are
used in paragraph 5) is of no consequence because each refers to
indicia of the nationality of the vessel permissible. This is reflected in
Articles 5 and 6 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas,60 and
Articles 91 and 92 of the UNCLOS.61
Paragraph 5 of Article 8bis sets forth the procedures for ship
boarding. Whenever law enforcement or other authorized officials of a
state party (“the Requesting Party”) encounter a ship flying the flag
or displaying the marks of registry of another state party (“the First
Party”) located seaward of any state’s territorial sea, and the
requesting party has reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship or a
person on board the ship has been, is, or is about to be involved in
the commission of an offense under Articles 3, 3bis, 3ter, or 3quater of
the 1988 SUA Convention, and the requesting party desires to board,
it shall take the following steps. In this situation, law enforcement
must request, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2, that the First
Party confirm the claim of nationality. If nationality is confirmed, the
Requesting Party shall ask the First Party (also called “the flag
state”) for authorization to take appropriate measures. This may
58.

Id. art. 8 (adding this provision in Article 8bis(4)).

59.

1988 Vienna Narcotic Drug Convention, supra note 54, art. 17, 1582
U.N.T.S. at 197; Migrant Smuggling Protocol, supra note 55, art. 8(1),
2241 U.N.T.S. at 510.

60.

Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 13
U.S.T 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (entered into force Sept. 30, 1962),
[hereinafter High Seas Convention]. Parties to this treaty include only
Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius and South Africa from the Djibouti Code
of Conduct.

61.

UNCLOS, supra note 12, arts. 91, 92, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 433; see also
2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 8 (adding similar provisions in
Article 8bis(5)(a),(b), and (d)).
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include stopping, boarding, and searching the ship, its cargo and
persons on board, as well as questioning the persons on board.62
The flag state may, pursuant to Article 8bis(5)(c), authorize the
Requesting Party to board and take appropriate measures described
in subparagraph (b), conduct the boarding and search with its own
law enforcement or other officials, conduct the boarding and search
together with the requesting party, or decline to authorize a boarding
and search.63 Article 8bis(5)(c) expands on the provisions of Article
17(4) of the 1988 Vienna Narcotic Drug Convention and Article 8(2)
of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol. Nothing in Article 8bis(5) requires
the flag state to provide any such authorization. Moreover,
Article 8bis(5)(c) makes clear that the Requesting Party may not take
any measures set forth above without the express authorization of the
flag state. A flag state may also impose certain restrictions on the
Requesting Party’s board and search measures, in accordance with
Article 8bis(7), discussed in greater detail below.
A state party may provide advance consent to board ships flying
its flag or displaying its mark of registry pursuant to subparagraphs
(d) or (e) of Article 8bis(5) by notification to the IMO
Secretary-General.64 A notification pursuant to Article 8bis(5)(d)
would grant the Requesting Party authorization to board and search
a ship, its cargo and persons on board, and to question the persons on
board in order to locate and examine documentation of its nationality
and determine if an offense under Articles 3, 3bis, 3ter, or 3quater of
the 1988 SUA Convention has been, is being, or is about to be
committed, if there is no response from that state party, within four
hours of acknowledgement of its receipt of a request to confirm
nationality.65 Notification pursuant to Article 8bis(5)(e) would provide
general advance consent for other state parties to board and search
such ships, their cargo, and persons on board, and to question the
persons on board in order to determine if an offense under Articles 3,
3bis, 3ter, or 3quater of the 1988 SUA Convention has been, is being,
or is about to be committed. These optional notifications may be
withdrawn at any time.66 Advance consent pursuant to either
subparagraph (d) or (e) is not authorization for detention of the
vessel, cargo, or persons on board or any other enforcement action.67
62.

2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 8 (adding these provisions to
Article 8bis(5)(a) and (b)).

63.

Id. (adding the authorization to Article 8bis(5)(c)).

64.

2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 8(2) (adding these provisions to
Article 8bis(5)(d) and (e)).

65.

Id.

66.

Id.

67.

Id.
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Under paragraph 6 of Article 8bis, when the requesting Party
boards and finds evidence of the conduct described in Articles 3, 3bis,
3ter or 3quater, the flag state may authorize the Requesting Party to
detain the ship, cargo, and persons on board, pending receipt of
disposition instructions from the flag state. The Requesting Party
must in all cases promptly inform the flag state of the results of a
boarding, search, and detention conducted pursuant to Article 8bis,
including discovery of evidence of illegal conduct that is not subject to
the 1988 SUA Convention.68
Paragraph 7 of Article 8bis permits a flag state to subject its
authorization under paragraphs 5 or 6 to conditions, including
obtaining additional information from the Requesting Party and
relating to responsibility for and the extent of measures to be taken.
This provision builds on the text of Article 17(6) of the 1988 Vienna
Narcotic Drug Convention and Article 8(5) of the Migrant Smuggling
Protocol. Paragraph 7 also prohibits the Requesting State from taking
any measures without the express authorization of the flag state,
except when necessary to relieve imminent danger to the lives of
persons or when otherwise derived from bilateral or multilateral
agreements.69
Paragraph 8 of Article 8bis reaffirms explicitly that, for all
boardings under Article 8bis, the flag state retains the right to
exercise jurisdiction over a detained ship, cargo, or other items and
persons on board, including seizure, forfeiture, arrest, and prosecution.
However, the flag state may, subject to its constitution and laws,
consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by another state party that has
jurisdiction under Article 6 of the 1988 SUA Convention.70
Paragraph 9 of Article 8bis sets forth overarching principles for
the use of force by officials acting under the ship boarding regime. It
directs state parties to avoid the use of force “except when necessary
to ensure the safety of its officials and persons on board, or where the
officials are obstructed in the execution of the authorized actions.”71
Paragraph 9 also specifies that any such use of force “shall not exceed
the minimum degree of force which is necessary and reasonable in the
circumstances.”72 The language of Article 8bis(9) is drawn from
Article 22(1)(f) of the Agreement for the Implementation of the
Provisions of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10
December 1982, Relating to the Conservation and Management of

68.

Id.

69.

Id.

70.

Id.

71.

Id.

72.

Id.
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Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.73 As such,
this use of force provision is consistent with current practice on the
use of force in international law.
Paragraph 10 of Article 8bis establishes a number of safeguard
provisions to protect seafarers and carriers during the conduct of ship
boardings. First, subparagraph (a) sets forth a series of safeguards
that a state party taking measures against a ship must respect. These
measures include taking due account of the need not to endanger the
safety of life at sea; treating all persons in a manner that preserves
their human dignity and complies with applicable provisions of
international law; ensuring that a boarding and search is conducted in
accordance with applicable international law; taking due account of
the safety and security of the ship and cargo; taking due account of
the need not to prejudice the commercial or legal interests of the flag
state; ensuring, within available means, that any measure taken with
regard to the ship or its cargo is environmentally sound; ensuring that
any person on board against whom proceedings may be commenced in
connection with offenses under the 1988 SUA Convention is
guaranteed fair treatment, regardless of location; ensuring that the
master of a ship is advised of its intention to board, and is, or has
been, afforded the opportunity to contact the ship’s owner and the
flag state at the earliest opportunity; and taking reasonable efforts to
avoid undue detention or delay of the ship.74 These safeguards build
on those contained in Article 17(5) of the 1988 Vienna Narcotic Drug
Convention and Article 9 of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol.75
Article 8bis(10)(b) establishes a framework for liability and
recourse arising from any damage, harm, or loss attributable to state
73.

Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982
Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for signature Dec. 4, 1995,
2167 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 11, 2001). Of the participants
in the Djibouti Code of Conduct, France, Kenya, Maldives, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Oman, Seychelles and South Africa are party. Compare
Djibouti
Code
of
Conduct,
OCEANS
BEYOND
PIRACY,
http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/matrix/activity/djibouti-code-conduct
(last visited Mar. 14, 2014), with Status of Treaties, U.N. TREATY
COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-7&chapter=21&lang=en.

74.

2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 8(2).

75.

1988 Vienna Narcotic Drug Convention, supra note 54, art. 17(5), 1582
U.N.T.S. at 197 (“Parties concerned shall take due account of the need
not to endanger the safety of life at sea, the security of the vessel and
the cargo or to prejudice the commercial and legal interests of the flag
State or any other interested state”); Migrant Smuggling Protocol, supra
note 55, art. 9, 2241 U.N.T.S. at 511 (containing a number of safeguard
clauses, including those related to the safety of the vessel and persons on
board).
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parties taking measures under Article 8bis. It clarifies that
authorization to board by a flag state shall not per se give rise to its
liability. Liability for damage, harm, or loss as a result of ship
boarding activities arises under two circumstances. The first
circumstance occurs when the grounds for ship boarding measures
prove to be unfounded, provided that the ship has not committed any
act justifying the measures taken. The second circumstance takes
place when such measures are unlawful or unreasonable in light of the
available information to implement the provisions of Article 8bis.76
State parties are obligated to “provide effective recourse in respect of
such damage, harm or loss.”77 This provision does not require a state
party to provide a specific remedy, forum, or venue, and it does not
require any form of binding dispute resolution. Accordingly, the
manner of “effective recourse” remains at the discretion of each state
party. Article 8bis(10)(b) of the 1988 SUA Convention is consistent
with the claims provisions of existing relevant international treaties,
including Article 22(3) of the High Seas Convention and Article 9(2)
of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol.78
Article 8bis(10)(c) requires any state party that takes measures
against a ship in accordance with the 1988 SUA Convention to take
due account of the need not to interfere with the rights and
obligations and exercise of jurisdiction of coastal states in accordance
with the international law of the sea and the authority of flag states
to exercise jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical, and
social matters involving the ship.79 This provision builds upon Article
17(11) of the 1988 Vienna Drug Convention, Article 94(1) of
UNCLOS, and Article 9(3) of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol.80

76.

2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 8(2).

77.

Id.

78.

High Seas Convention, supra note 60, art. 22(3), 450 U.N.T.S. at 94 (“If
the suspicions prove to be unfounded, and provided that the ship
boarded has not committed any act justifying them, it shall be
compensated for any loss or damage that may have been sustained.”);
Migrant Smuggling Protocol, supra note 55, art. 9(2), 2241 U.N.T.S. at
511 (“Where the grounds for measures taken pursuant to article 8 of
this Protocol prove to be unfounded, the vessel shall be compensated for
any loss or damage that may have been sustained, provided that the
vessel has not committed any act justifying the measures taken.”).

79.

2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 8(2).

80.

1988 Vienna Narcotic Drug Convention, supra note 54, art. 17(11), 1582
U.N.T.S. at 198 (stating that measures should not affect the rights and
obligations and the exercise of jurisdiction of coastal states); UNCLOS,
supra note 12, art. 94(1), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 434 (“Every State shall
effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative,
technical and social matters over ships flying its flag.”); Migrant
Smuggling Protocol, supra note 55, art. 9(3), 2241 U.N.T.S. at 511
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Subparagraphs (d) and (e) of Article 8bis(10) designate who may
conduct ship boardings consistent with the 1988 SUA Convention.
Article 8bis(10)(d) requires that any ship boarding measure must be
carried out by law enforcement or other authorized officials from
warships or military aircraft, or from other ships or aircraft clearly
marked and identifiable as being on government service and
authorized to that effect. Additionally, notwithstanding Articles 2 and
2bis of the 1988 SUA Convention, the provisions of Article 8bis will
apply.81 This provision reflects the accepted international law rule as
set out in Article 17(10) of the 1988 Vienna Narcotic Drug
Convention, Article 9(4) of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol,
Articles 21 and 23(4) of the High Seas Convention, and Articles 107
and 111(5) of UNCLOS.82 Article 8bis(10)(e) defines “law enforcement
or other authorized officials” as “uniformed or otherwise clearly
identifiable members of law enforcement or other government
authorities duly authorized by their government.”83 For the purposes
of ship boarding under the 1988 SUA Convention, these officials must
provide appropriate government-issued identification documents for
examination by the master of the ship upon boarding.
The ship boarding provisions under the 1988 SUA Convention do
not apply to or limit boarding of ships conducted by any state party
in accordance with international law, seaward of any state’s territorial
sea. Paragraph 11 of Article 8bis confirms this understanding of the
1988 SUA Convention’s applicability.84 Other lawful ship boarding
measures include, but are not limited to, the right of approach and
visit; belligerent rights under the law of war; self-defense; the
enforcement of U.N. Security Council Resolutions; actions taken
pursuant to specific bilateral or multilateral instruments such as
counter-narcotics agreements; the rendering of assistance to persons,
ships, and property in peril; authorization from the flag state to take
action; or the historic role of the armed forces in law enforcement
activities on the high seas.85 Article 8bis would not affect these rights.
(indicating that measures cannot interfere with the exercise of
jurisdiction of the coastal or flag state).
81.

2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 8(2).

82.

1988 Vienna Narcotic Drug Convention, supra note 54, art. 17(10), 1582
U.N.T.S. at 198 (stating that action must be carried out by warships,
military aircraft, or other vessels marked as being in government
service); Migrant Smuggling Protocol, supra note 55, art. 9(4), 2241
U.N.T.S. at 511 (same); High Seas Convention, supra note 60, arts. 21,
23(4), 450 U.N.T.S. at 92, 94 (same); UNCLOS, supra note 12,
arts. 107, 111(5), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 437, 439 (same).

83.

2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 8(2).

84.

Id.

85.

J. Ashley Roach, Global Conventions on Piracy, Ship Hijacking, Hostage
Taking and Maritime Terrorism: Prospects for Cooperation, in PIRACY
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Paragraph 12 of Article 8bis encourages states parties to develop
standard operating procedures for joint operations, and recommends
consultation, as appropriate, with other state parties with a view to
harmonizing such standard operating procedures. Paragraph 13 allows
state parties to conclude agreements or arrangements between
themselves to facilitate law enforcement operations carried out
pursuant to Article 8bis. This provision is adapted from Article 17(9)
of the 1988 Vienna Narcotic Drug Convention and Article 17 of the
Migrant Smuggling Protocol.86 Paragraph 14 requires each state party
to take appropriate measures to ensure that law enforcement or other
authorized officials acting on its behalf are empowered to conduct ship
boarding activities and take other appropriate measures pursuant to
Article 8bis.87
Finally, paragraph 15 of Article 8bis directs each state party to
designate the appropriate authority or authorities to receive and
respond to requests for assistance, confirmation of nationality, and
authorization to take appropriate measures. This designation,
including contact information of the authority or authorities, must be
notified to the IMO Secretary-General within one month of becoming
a party. The IMO Secretary-General will inform all other state parties
within one month of such designation. Under paragraph 15 of
Article 8bis, each state party is responsible for providing prompt
notice through the IMO Secretary-General of any changes in the
designation or contact information.88 This provision is adapted from
Article 17(7) of the 1988 Vienna Narcotic Drug Convention and
Article 8(6) of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol.89

INTERNATIONAL MARITIME CRIMES
Beckman & J. Ashley Roach eds., 2012).

AND

IN

ASEAN 55 (Robert C.

86.

1998 Vienna Narcotic Drug Convention, supra note 54, art. 17(9), 1582
U.N.T.S. at 198.

87.

Migrant Smuggling Protocol, supra note 55, art. 17, 2241 U.N.T.S. at
515.

88.

2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 8(2). Only Latvia is reported by
the IMO to have made the notification required by Article 8bis. IMO,
supra note 9, at 431.

89.

1988 Vienna Narcotic Drug Convention, supra note 54, art. 17(7), 1582
U.N.T.S. at 198 (stating “at the time of becoming a Party to this
Convention, each Party shall designate an authority or, when necessary,
authorities to receive and respond to such requests. Such designation
shall be notified through the Secretary-General to all other Parties
within one month of the designation.”); Migrant Smuggling Protocol,
supra note 55, art. 8(6), 2241 U.N.T.S. at 511 (stating “[e]ach State
Party shall designate an authority or, where necessary, authorities to
receive and respond to requests for assistance, for confirmation of
registry or of the right of a vessel to fly its flag and for authorization to
take appropriate measures. Such designation shall be notified through

114

CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 46·2013
Global Conventions on Maritime Crimes Involving Piratical Acts

Article 9 of the 2005 SUA Protocol amends Article 10(2) of the
1988 SUA Convention by adding specific reference to international
law including international human rights law. This amendment is
intended to further enhance the safeguards for seafarers. As revised,
Article 10(2) of the Convention provides that any person who is taken
into custody or otherwise subject to proceedings under the 1988 SUA
Convention shall be guaranteed fair treatment, including all rights
and guarantees under the law of the state in which that person is
present, as well as “applicable provisions of international law,
including international human rights law.”90 This additional text
already appears in Article 17 of the Terrorism Financing Convention
and in Article 14 of the Terrorist Bombings Convention.91

VII. Arrest and Prosecution
There is no authority under the 1988 SUA or Hostage-Taking
Conventions to board ships on high seas and seize offenders without
flag state consent.92 These conventions also apply when the alleged
offenders are present in the territory or territorial sea of a state
party.93 Once alleged offenders are present in the territory of a state
party, the state party is under an obligation to take the offenders into
custody, and to prosecute them or extradite them to their home
country.94
Under the 1988 SUA Convention, the master of a ship may
deliver to any other state party “any person who he has reasonable
grounds to believe has committed [a SUA offense].”95 For example,
the Secretary-General to all other States Parties within one month of
the designation.”).
90.

2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 4, art. 9.

91.

Terrorism Financing Convention, supra note 35, art. 17, 2178 U.N.T.S.
197 at 237 (stating that any person taken into custody under the
convention shall be treated fairly in accordance with international law
and international human rights law); Terrorist Bombings Convention,
supra note 38, art. 14, 2149 U.N.T.S. at 290 (same).

92.

1988 SUA Convention, supra note 3, art. 3(1)(a), 1678 U.N.T.S. at 224;
see Hostage-Taking Convention, supra note 2, art. 14, 1316 U.N.T.S. at
210 (“Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as justifying the
violation of the territorial integrity or political independence of a State
in contravention of the Charter of the United Nations.”).

93.

1988 SUA Convention, supra note 3, art. 4(1), 1678 U.N.T.S. at 225; see
Hostage-Taking Convention, supra note 2, art. 5(1)(a), 1316 U.N.T.S. at
207.

94.

1988 SUA Convention, supra note 3, art. 10(1), 1678 U.N.T.S. at 229;
see Hostage-Taking Convention, supra note 2, art. 6(1), 1316 U.N.T.S.
at 208.

95.

1988 SUA Convention, supra note 3, art. 8(1), 1678 U.N.T.S. at 228.
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since Kenya is a party to the 1988 SUA Convention and the
Hostage-Taking Convention, warships that seize pirates in the
territorial sea or exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of Somalia can
deliver them to Kenya for prosecution and trial. The Hostage-Taking
Convention and the 1988 SUA Convention also have provisions which
make it possible to arrest and prosecute accomplices and leaders on
land. The conventions provide that a person commits an offense if
they abet the commission of any offense or if they are an accomplice
of a person who commits an offense. Relevant accomplice provisions
were discussed earlier in this article.

VIII. EXTRADITION96
The Hostage-Taking Convention and the 1988 SUA Convention
both contain similar provisions on extradition. While the 2005 SUA
Protocol brings the extradition provisions of the 1988 SUA
Convention in line with the modern terrorism conventions, the
extradition provisions of the Hostage-Taking Convention have not yet
been updated.
Article (10)(2) of the 2005 SUA Protocol adds a new provision to
the 1988 SUA Convention, Article 11bis, which states that none of
the offenses under the 1988 SUA Convention shall be regarded, for
the purposes of extradition or mutual legal assistance, as a political
offense.97 Thus, a state may not refuse a request for extradition or
mutual legal assistance solely by claiming a political offense.
Similarly, a state cannot base its refusal on the grounds that the
offense was connected with a political offense, or the offense was
inspired by political motives. Article 11bis thus usefully restricts a
state’s ability to utilize the political offense exception in response to
extradition requests pursuant to the 1988 SUA Convention. Like
similar provisions in Article 14 of the Terrorism Financing
Convention and Article 11 of the Terrorist Bombings Convention,
Article 11bis builds on this trend by making the restriction on the
invocation of the political offense exception for requests based on
offenses under Articles 3, 3bis, 3ter, and 3quater a matter of general
application. This now occurs in place of a dependence on the terms of
individual bilateral law enforcement treaties between the states
parties.98
Article 10(3) of the 2005 SUA Protocol adds Article 11ter to the
1988 SUA Convention, which provides that the 1988 SUA Convention
96.

The summary of these provisions on extradition is taken from Senate
Treaty Document 110-8. SEN. T. DOC. 110-8 supra note 24, at XXIV–
XXV.

97.

Id. at XXIV.

98.

Id.
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does not impose an obligation to extradite or afford mutual legal
assistance if the requested state party has substantial grounds for
believing that such a request for extradition or mutual legal assistance
has been made for a group of potential purposes. These purposes
include prosecuting and punishing a person on account of that
person’s race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, political opinion, or
gender. Further, the 1988 SUA Convention does not improve on
obligations to extradite or afford mutual legal assistance if compliance
with the request would cause prejudice to that person’s position for
any of the same reasons outlined above.99 This Article is similar to
provisions already included in a number of existing U.N.
counterterrorism treaties, including Article 12 of the Terrorist
Bombings Convention and Article 15 of the Terrorism Financing
Convention.100 Aug

IX. MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE101
The Hostage-Taking Convention and the 1988 SUA Convention
both contain similar provisions on mutual legal assistance. While the
2005 SUA Protocol brings the mutual legal assistance provisions of
the 1988 SUA Convention in line with the modern terrorism
conventions, the mutual legal assistance provisions of the
Hostage-Taking Convention have not yet been updated.
Article 11(1) of the 2005 SUA Protocol makes conforming changes
to Article 12(1) of the 1988 SUA Convention, which maintains state
parties’ obligations to afford one another assistance in connection with
criminal proceedings brought for offenses under the 1988 SUA
Convention. The amended provision updates the terms of assistance
to encompass the new categories of offenses under the 1988 SUA
Convention, as amended by the 2005 SUA Protocol, but it does not
change the substantive language describing the degree of assistance
required.102
Article 11(2) of the 2005 SUA Protocol does, however, establish a
system to enhance the assistance that state parties may provide to
each other in connection with offenses under the 1988 SUA
Convention. It provides for a new article, Article 12bis, to govern the
transfer of individuals in the custody of one state party to provide

99.

Id. at XXIV–XXV.

100. Id. at XXV.
101. The summary of these provisions on mutual legal assistance is taken
from Senate Treaty Document 110-8. SEN. T. DOC. 110-8 supra note 24,
at XXV–XXVI.
102. Id. at XXV.
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assistance to another state party in connection with an investigation
or prosecution for offenses under the 1988 SUA Convention.103
Paragraph 1 of Article 12bis provides that a person who is being
detained or is serving a sentence in the territory of one state party
whose presence in another state party is requested for identification,
testimony or otherwise providing assistance in obtaining evidence for
the investigation or prosecution of offenses set forth in Articles 3, 3bis,
3ter, and 3quater may be transferred, if two conditions are met. First,
the person in custody must freely give informed consent to be
transferred. Second, the competent authorities of both states must
agree upon the transfer, subject to such conditions as those states
may deem appropriate.104 Similar provisions for the temporary transfer
of persons in custody of one state party to another state party are
included in Article 16 of the Terrorism Financing Convention,
Article 13 of the Terrorist Bombings Convention, and numerous
bilateral mutual legal assistance treaties.105
Paragraph 2 of Article 12bis details certain rights and obligations
of a state to which a person is transferred pursuant to Article 12bis.
Under subparagraph (a), the state to which the person is transferred
maintains the authority and obligation to keep the transferred person
in custody, unless otherwise requested or authorized by the state from
which the person was transferred. Next, subparagraph (b) requires the
state to which the person is transferred to implement without delay
its obligation to return the person to the custody of the state from
which the person was transferred as agreed in advance, or as
otherwise agreed, by the competent authorities of both states.
Additionally, subparagraph (c) states that return of a person
transferred under Article 12bis shall not require initiation of
extradition proceedings. Finally, subparagraph (d) requires that the
person transferred receive credit for service of the sentence being
served in the state from which the person was transferred for time
spent in the custody of the state to which the person was
transferred.106
Paragraph 3 of Article 12bis establishes a default rule that a
person transferred pursuant to Article 12bis, whatever that person’s
nationality, shall not be prosecuted, detained, or subjected to any
other restriction of personal liberty in the territory of the state to
which that person is transferred for acts or convictions prior to that
person’s departure from the territory of the transferring state.
However, the state party from which the person was transferred
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at XXV–XXVI.
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pursuant to Article 12bis may agree otherwise, in which case this
default rule will not impair the agreement between the state from
which the person is transferred and the state to which the person is
transferred.107
Article 12 of the 2005 SUA Protocol makes conforming changes to
Article 13 of the 1988 SUA Convention to incorporate references to
the new offenses. As amended, Article 13 provides that state parties
shall cooperate in the prevention of offenses set forth in Articles 3,
3bis, 3ter, and 3quater by taking all practicable measures to prevent
preparation in their respective territories for the commission of such
offenses and by exchanging information and coordinating measures to
prevent the commission of such offenses. Article 13 also provides that
any state party shall be bound to exercise all possible efforts to avoid
undue delay or detention of a ship, its passengers, crew, or cargo
when the passage of that ship has been delayed or interrupted due to
the commission of an offense under Articles 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater.108
Articles 13 and 14 of the 2005 SUA Protocol make conforming
amendments to Article 14 and Article 15, paragraph 3, of the 1988
SUA Convention to make those provisions consistent with the new
articles and terminology added to the 1988 SUA Convention by the
2005 SUA Protocol. These provisions govern information sharing
under the 1988 SUA Convention with respect to any offense or
suspected offenses under the 1988 SUA Convention.109

X. How These Conventions Deal with Piracy
Hijackings off Somalia are offenses under the Hostage-Taking
Convention because the pirates intend to hold the crew hostage until
ransom is paid. The pirates clearly commit the offense of
hostage-taking when they board (or attempt to board) the ship,
detain the crew, and finally release the crew after ransom is demanded
and paid. Again, in the context of Somali piracy, offenders of hostagetaking include the pirates who board and detain a ship, and also those
pirates who attempt to stop a ship but fail (perhaps due to the
successful employment of Best Management Practices).110 In addition,
those who assist the pirates, including the “mother ship” operators
and providers of logistics support ashore, also commit the offense of
hostage-taking as aiders and abettors.
107. Id. at XXVI.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. BMP 4: BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES FOR PROTECTION AGAINST
SOMALI BASED PIRACY 1 (2011), available at http://www.mschoa.org/
docs/public-documents/bmp4_low_res_sep_5_2011.pdf (stating the
definition of piracy for the purposes of the Best Management Practices).
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Hijackings of vessels off Somalia are also offenses under the 1988
SUA Convention because the seizure of a ship by force is a SUA
offense. Somali pirates boarding a ship commit the offense described
in Article 3(1)(a) with this violent and intentional action.111 As with
hostage-taking, pirates commit a SUA offense even if they fail to
exercise control over a ship, and those who abet the offense or are
accomplices also commit a SUA offense.
These acts can be offenses under the Hostage Taking and 1988
SUA Convention even if they took place in the territorial sea of
another state.112 This is in contrast to the territorial limitations of the
crime of piracy, which can only occur on the high seas, EEZ, or
outside the jurisdiction of any state.113 Moreover, the three
conventions not only encompass a broad scope of offenses that can
include piracy, but they also contain provisions that have particular
relevance to the crime of piracy. Indeed, the U.N. Security Council
reiterated this point in Resolutions 1846 and 2020. It recognized that
many countries afflicted with piracy do not have adequate domestic
legislation that deals specifically with piracy, and they have even less
guidance on how to treat and prosecute pirates once they are
captured. In light of this absence, the Security Council reiterates first
that the 1988 SUA Convention can help fill this void by, inter alia,
creating offenses and establishing jurisdiction.114 Resolution 2020 also
incorporates the Hostage-Taking Convention by condemning the
offenses included therein. Thus, the international community strongly
endorses ratification of these treaties, or domestic legislation
containing similar language, in order to effectively combat maritime
piracy.115

XI. Conclusion
The Hostage-Taking Convention and the 1988 SUA Convention
collectively fill many of the limitations in the UNCLOS articles on
piracy. Further, the 2005 SUA Protocol makes significant
improvements to its predecessor. Used together, these instruments
complement each other in the context of piracy and armed robbery at
sea. As seafarers from all countries, and the ships of all countries, are
111. 1988 SUA Convention, supra note 3, art. 3(1)(a), 1678 U.N.T.S. at 224.
112. Id. art. 4(1); see Hostage-Taking Convention, supra note 2, art. 3(1),
1316 U.N.T.S. at 207 (providing that a state “in the territory of which
the hostage is held by the offender shall take all measures it considers
appropriate to ease the situation of the hostage”).
113. UNCLOS, supra note 12, arts. 58(2), 101, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 419, 436.
114. See S.C. Res. 1846, para. 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008);
S.C. Res. 2020, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/2020 (Nov. 22, 2011).
115. See S.C. Res. 2020, supra note 114, pmbl.
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vulnerable to piracy and armed robbery at sea, to the extent that
they have not yet done so, all countries should promptly ratify and
implement each of the three primary treaties.
If all the states in this and other regions ratified and effectively
implemented the Hostage-Taking Convention, the 1988 SUA
Convention, and the 2005 SUA Protocol, they would give the
international community another set of useful tools to combat piracy
and armed robbery at sea.116
Table 1
Participants
in Djibouti
Code of
Conduct

Signed
Djibouti
Code of
Conduct

Party
to High
Seas
Conv.117

Party
to
UNCLOS118

Party
to 1988
SUA
Conv.119

Party to
2005 SUA
Protocol120

Party
to
Hostage
Taking
Conv.121

Comoros

23/11/09

yes

yes

yes

Djibouti

29/09/09

yes

yes

yes

Egypt

01/10/09

yes

yes

yes

Eritrea

26/10/10

116. The U.N. General Assembly, in its omnibus resolution on Oceans and
the Law of the Sea adopted on December 11, 2012, called upon states
that have not yet done so to become parties to the 1988 and 2005 SUA
Conventions and urged “States parties to take appropriate measures to
ensure the effective implementation of those instruments through the
adoption of legislation, where appropriate” and to the Migrant
Smuggling Protocol and “to take appropriate measures to ensure their
effective implementation.” G.A. Res. 67/78, ¶¶ 107, 114, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/67/78 (Dec. 11, 2012).
117. Status of High Seas Convention, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_n
o=XXI-2&chapter=21&lang=en (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
118. Status of UNCLOS, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/
pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI~6&chapte
r=21&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
119. IMO, supra note 9, at 430. With the exception of Saudi Arabia, none of
these states are party to the 2005 SUA Protocol.
120. Id.
121. Status of Hostage-Taking Convention, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/UNTC/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&
mtdsg_no=XVIII-5&chapter=18&lang=en (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
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Participants
in Djibouti
Code of
Conduct

Ethiopia

Signed
Djibouti
Code of
Conduct

Party
to High
Seas
Conv.

29/09/09

France

Party
to
Hostage
Taking
Conv.

Party
to
UNCLOS

Party
to 1988
SUA
Conv.

/s/122

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

Party to
2005 SUA
Protocol

Jordan

20/05/10

Kenya

29/09/09

yes

yes

yes

yes

Madagascar

29/09/09

yes

yes

yes

yes

Maldives

29/09/09

Mauritius

23/03/10

yes

yes

yes

Mozambique

06/07/12

yes

yes

yes

Oman

29/07/10

yes

yes

yes

Saudi
Arabia

10/03/10

yes

yes

Seychelles

29/09/09

yes

yes

yes

Somalia

29/09/09

yes

South Africa

15/05/12

yes

yes

yes

Sudan

01/12/09

yes

yes

yes

UAE

18/04/11

/s/

yes

yes

Tanzania

29/09/09

yes

yes

yes

Yemen

29/09/09

yes

yes

yes

18

18

Totals (21)

20

yes
yes

yes

4

yes

1

yes

18

122. The “/s/” indicates the party has only signed the treaty, but has not
ratified or acceded to it.
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Table 2
Participants
in Djibouti
Code of
Conduct

Party to
1988
Vienna
Drug
Convention
123

Party to
2000
Migrant
Smuggling
Protocol124

Party to
1997
Terrorist
Bombing
Convention

Party to
Terrorism
Financing
Conv.126

Party
to
TOC127

Party
to
CAC128

yes

yes

yes

yes

125

Comoros

yes

Djibouti

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

Egypt

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

Eritrea

yes

Ethiopia

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

France

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

Jordan

yes

yes

yes

yes

Kenya

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

Madagascar

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

123. Status of 1988 Vienna Narcotic Drug Convention, U.N. TREATY
COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI-19&chapter=6&lang=en (last visited Mar.
14, 2014).
124. Status of Migrant Smuggling Protocol, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=XVIII-12b&chapter=18&lang=en (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
125. Status of Terrorist Bombing Convention, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_n
o=XVIII-9&chapter=18&lang=en (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
126. Status of Terrorism Financing Convention, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_n
o=XVIII-11&chapter=18&lang=en (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
127. Status of 2000 U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12&chapter=18&
lang=en (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
128. Status of 2003 U.N. Convention against Corruption, U.N. TREATY
COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_
no=XVIII-14&chapter=18&lang=en (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
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Participants
in Djibouti
Code of
Conduct

Party to
1988
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Drug
Convention

Party to
2000
Migrant
Smuggling
Protocol

Party to
1997
Terrorist
Bombing
Convention

Party to
Terrorism
Financing
Conv.

Party
to
TOC

Party
to
CAC

yes

yes

yes

yes

Maldives

yes

Mauritius

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

Mozambique

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

Oman

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

Saudi
Arabia

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

Seychelles

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

/s/

Somalia
South Africa

yes

Sudan

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

/s/

UAE

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

Tanzania

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

Yemen

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

Totals (21)

20

17

19

19

18

yes

13
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